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RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
ACTIONS: A NARROWING INTERPRETATION: "
CoURTS have long insisted that parties be given the same constitutional
right to jury trial in declaratory actions' as they have in non-declaratory pro-
ceedings.2 To determine whether jury trial should be granted, a simple rule
of thumb has been adopted: The right to jury trial is preserved if either party
would be entitled to it in any action for which the declaratory action is a sub-
stitute.3 Proper application of the rule would forestall any argument that
based on a finding of innocence from evidence discovered after conviction, upon motion
the judgment of conviction must be set aside, the indictment dismissed, and the de-
fendant returned to his status of innocence. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 697. This statute
was designed to clarify the status of a person pardoned on the ground of innocence. In
many states the courts have held that a pardon does not wipe out the pardonlec's "con-
viction", and have failed to distinguish between pardons granted for innocence and those
granted for other reasons. See 3 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY 267-94; Wcihofen, The
Effect of a Pardon, 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 177 (1939); Williston, Does a Pardon Blot
Out Guilt?, 28 HAv. L. REv. 647 (1915). Despite pardon, a conviction has been used to
discredit a -witness, disbar an attorney, refuse an application for naturalization, withhold
a license to engage in a business, and invoke the provisions of a recidivist statute imposing
increased penalties on repeating offenders. See Note, 59 HARv. L. RLv. 1174 (1946).
The New York statute differs slightly from the Rhode Island statute involved in the
Garnetto case. The Gansetto statute orders a court to quash sentence but leaves the
judgment of conviction undisturbed, whereas the New York statute orders a court to set
aside the judgment of conviction. This difference is of little significance, however, be-
cause if a legislature can order a court to quash sentence, there appears to be no reason
why it cannot also order a court to set aside the conviction upon which the sentence is
based. Legislative power to wipe out the main consequence of conviction-namely, in-
carceration-should carry with it the power to wipe out the collateral consequences. Thus
the New York statute would appear to be constitutional, although this question has not
been passed upon by the New York courts.
*United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Spring Brook Farm Dairy, Inc., 135
Conn. 294, 64 A.2d 39 (1949).
1. Federal courts and the courts of forty-four states now render declaratory judg-
ments. Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Oklahoma courts do not. Developments in
the Law--Declaratory Judginents-1941-1949, 62 HA~v. L. Ray. 787, 791 (1949).
2. See, e.g., Dickinson v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 147 F.2d
396 (9th Cir. 1945); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 4,16 (9th Cir. 1939).
Writers on the subject unanimously agree that parties' rights to jury trial are gov-
erned by the same rules which apply in non-declaratory actions. AN iERSo0, AcmroNs Yon
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 498-9 (1940); BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 401 (2d
ed. 1941) ; Hearings Before Senate Subconmittee on Judiciary on H.R. 5623, 70th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1928) passim; Morrison, Availability of the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act for Life insurance Cases, 23 A.B.A.J. 788, 789 (1937). This view is reflected in
the adoption of the new Judicial Code, which omits any reference to jury trial In de-
claratory actions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2 (1948). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
govern here as in other actions. Vanneman & Kutner, Declaratory Judgments it tIhe
Federal Courts, 9 Olto ST. L. J. 209, 220 (1948) ; Revisers' Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 2202
(Cong. Serv. 1948).
3. E.g., Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, supra note 2.
In a situation analogous to the principal case a federal court has held that where the
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declaratory judgments are unconstitutional as a deprivation of the right to
jury trial.4 Occasional decisions5 within the past several years, however, have
shown either a lingering misunderstanding of the nature of declaratory judg-
ments or an inadequate and unrealistic application of the rule of thumb.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Spring Brook Famn Dairy, Inc.,6
a recent Connecticut case, illustrates the apparently faulty reasoning by which
full protection of jury-trial rights can be denied.- Here the plaintiff had is-
sued two insurance policies to the dairy. One covered all its liability under the
Connecticut Workmen's Compensation Act ;8 the other covered ordinary motor
declaratory defendants could have sued at law or equity, their right to choose either
form of action should be recognized in the declaratory action and jury trial should be
granted on the issues triable in the law action. Ryan Dist. Corp. v. Caley, 51 F.Supp. 377
(E.D. Pa. 1943) (motion to strike demand for jury--denied), aff'd on other grounds, 147
F2d 138 (3rd Cir. 1945) (appeal from judgment n.o.v.-earlier issue not raised), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 859 (1945). See also Linahan v. Linahan, 131 Conn. 307, 39 A2d 895
(1944) (seeking a declaration of rights and duties under a trust). See, e.g., (American)
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Timms & Howard, 108 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1939) (seek-
ing declaration that truck was being used in manner not covered by policy) ; Lippman v.
Shapiro, 151 Fla. 327, 329, 9 So2d 636 (1942) (dismissal from equity of declaratory
petition seeking adjudication of plaintiff's rights under alleged assignment of open ac-
counts in order to preserve defendant's jury rights at law). Borchard approves this
rule. Bo RcHAD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 400-1.
This rule perhaps requires modification to include the few situations where a de-
claratory plaintiff could also have brought an action seeking equitable relief, as in suits
for cancellation of insurance policies. If it treats the declaratory action as obverse to
the equity suit, the court may here refuse jury trial. Id. at 400 n.63.
4. See, e.g., Petition of Kariher, 284 Pa. 455, 469-70, 131 At. 265, 270 (1925)
(Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act) ; Miles v. Strong, 63 Conn. 273, 286-7, 36 At.
55, 58-9 (1896) (upholding Connecticut act's constitutionality though jury trial not
specifically mentioned). See also cases cited note 2 supra.
The jury trial provision in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, providing that
issues of fact in declaratory actions should be tried and determined as issues of fact in
other civil actions are tried and determined, was inserted "... . to avoid either constitu-
tional or statutory objections to the act." Report of the Comtnittee on Declaratory Judg-
Wnents, HANDBOOK OF THE NAT. CoNs. or Co's IRS. oN UNoanmt STATE LAws 173, 180
(1920). On the federal act see 3 MooRE, FERAI PRAcrIcE 3231-2 (1933). One writer
has mistakenly argued that jury trial should not be required in any declaratory actions.
WIiS, CoNsTrTrriONAL LAW 555 (1936).
5. See cases cited in Developments in the Law--Declaratory .Tudgments-1941-1949,
62 HARv. L. Ruv. 787, 816, nn. 218-21 (1949).
6. 135 Conn. 294, 64 A.2d 39 (1949).
7. The applicable portion of the Connecticut constitution reads, "The right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate." CoNN. CoxsT. Art. I, §21. This section, a minimum
guarantee, has been made more explicit by statute. CONN. REv. STAT. §7936 (1949),
discussed in CLAR, CODE PLEADING 97 (2d ed. 1947). These principles, as regards de-
claratory judgments, are embodied in CONN. Pa.c. BY. § 251(f) (1948), which, as inter-
preted in the principal case, provides that issues of fact necessary to the determination
of the cause should be submitted to the jury as in other actions. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Spring Brook Farm Dairy, Inc., 135 Conn. 294, 297-8, 64 A.2d 39, 41
(1949).
8. CONN. Rav. STAT. §§ 7416-94 (1949).
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vehicle liability. Anticipating a tort suit against the dairy for the negligence
of its driver in causing the death of the deceased, the insurer sought a decla-
ration that deceased was an employee within the meaning of the Compensa-
tion Act. If such were the case, the Act's exclusive remedy provision0 would
have precluded liability in tort. The deceased's administrator claimed the case
for the jury list. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Errors held that the trial
court had erred in denying plaintiff's motion to have the case tried without
jury.1
0
The court used an historical test 1 in reaching its conclusion. Since work-
men's compensation was unknown when the Connecticut constitution was
adopted,12 the issue of a workman's coverage by the Act could not have been
tried to a jury at that time. Nor had the legislature extended the right of jury
trial to issues arising under the statute.' 3
If only compensation issues were raised, as the court assumed, the declara-
tory action might justifiably have been treated as obverse to a proceeding un-
der the Act, and hence triable without a jury. But on the facts of the case this
assumption was not justified. Had the declaratory action not taken the initia-
tive from the administrator, he would have had, the alternative of suing in
tort. In the tort action, the insured would have pleaded by way of defense that
deceased was an employee as defined by the Act and the administrator was
therefore precluded from suing at law.'4 In this action the administrator
9. CoNN. Ryv. STAT. § 7419 (1949).
10. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Errors was as favorable to the admin-
istrator, however, as was the judgment entered below. The court found that as a matter
of law deceased was not an employee within the meaning of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, CONN. Rrv. STAT., §§ 7416-94 (1949).
Although the question of jury trial was argued in the briefs of counsel on each side,
the line of argument here presented was not clearly suggested to the court. See Brief
for Appellee, pp. 2-5, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Spring Brook Farm
Dairy, Inc., 135 Conn. 294, 302-303, 64 A.2d 39, 43 (1949).
11. Courts generally grant jury trial in accordance with the so-called historical test,
i.e., if the code action is one which would have been tried at law before the codes, a
right to jury trial exists. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 91-102; James, Trial By Jury
and the New Federal Rules, 45 YALE L.J. 1022, 1023 (1936).
12. The Connecticut constitution was adopted in 1818; the Connecticut workmen's
compensation law was first enacted in 1913.
13. The Connecticut Workmen's Compensation Act provides that acceptance by em-
ployer and employee of the act shall be deemed to include a mutual waiver of the right
to jury trial on "... all questions affecting compensation .. " CONN. RsV. STAT.
§ 7419 (1949).
Most state workmen's compensation acts have similar provisions. The court in the
principal case, perhaps influenced by this provision, wavered between the tradition which
denies that workmen's compensation acts unconstitutionally limit the right to jury trial,
e.g., State of Washington ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac.
1101 (1911) (alternate holding), and the practice which grants full jury trial rights in
declaratory actions, note 2 supra.
14. Hammett v. Vogue, Inc., 179 Tenn. 284, 165 S.W.2d 577 (1942). Contra:
Ziegler v. Maurer, 15 N.J.Misc. 654, 194 At. 612 (Sup.Ct. 1937) (by implication). See
sources cited in 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S CoMiPENsATioN 243 (3d ed. 1941). The effect
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would have been entitled to jury trial.15 By denying in a declaratory action
the jury trial which the administrator would have had in the tort action, the
court deprived him of a right possessed before passage of the declaratory
judgment statute.' 6
Unless courts consider all possible actions which parties might bring, the
declaratory judgment procedure will become an important device for reward-
ing the fast-moving insurer. Most of the actions in which jury trial is made
an issue are petitions by insurance companies for declarations of non-liability
because of alleged non-coverage of policies., The denial of a jury trial in
these actions can have an important bearing on the outcome, for juries are
prone to settle any doubts regarding an insurer's liability in favor of the in-
jured party.'8
of workmen's compensation statutes on common law actions is discussed also in Hoao-
vrrz, WOaKxIEN'S COMTPENSATION 316-53 (1944).
15. CoNN. REv. STAT. § 7936 (1949). Where the issue of coverage is a mLxed
question of fact and law, it goes to the jury. Umsted v. Scofield Engineering Const. Co.,
203 Cal. 224, 263 Pac. 799 (1928) (error for trial court to find as matter of law that
deceased was special employee of defendant).
Since under one of the administrator's theories of recovery questions of fact did
edst in the Brook Farm case, the issue of coverage by the Compensation Act should have
been for the jury. The lower court did permit a jury trial and judgment was entered
for defendant on the basis of interrogatories and special findings by the court. Transcript
of Record, pp. 12-18, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Spring Brook Farm
Dairy, Inc., 135 Conn. 294, 64 A2d 39 (1949).
16. This conclusion is not open to the unqualified objection that the employer could
have petitioned for a compensation hearing and thus, by acting before the administrator
had sued at law, have secured a determination of issues by compensation officials. Some
acts do not provide for employer-initiated hearings. E.g., Pennsylvania, PA. ST. AxN.,
tit. 77, § 751 (Supp. 1948); and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. Aim. §34:15-50, 51 (1940).
If the law provides that employers may secure hearings, one of three courses will
be followed. In California, all issues raised in the hearing will be decided regardless
of possible effect on law actions either already in the courts or under preparation. Com-
munication to the YALE LAW JOUMAL from Dan Murphy, Jr., Chairman, California
Industrial Accident Commission, September 16, 1949. An opposite result may be reached
in Indiana and New York, where compensation officials wait for the termination of law
actions even though the employer may have sought a compensation hearing before the
law action was filed. Communications to the YALE LAw JoumNAL from faurice T.
Harrell, Chairman, Industrial Board of Indiana, September 19, 1949, and Henry J. Clay,
General Counsel, New York Workmen's Compensation Board, September 19, 1949. One
Connecticut commissioner takes a mid-way position and determines his course of action
according to the facts in each case. Communication to the YALE LAw Jou-AL. from
Louis Sachs, Commissioner, Third Congressional District, Connecticut, September 22,
1949.
17. BoRcHARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 402. At one time jury trial was demanded
only occasionally in declaratory actions. Id. at 403. It is apparently being demanded
with increasing frequency today. Developmcnts in the Law--Dccloralor, Judgmcnts-
1941-1949, 62 H.Av. L. RExv. 787, 836 (1949).
18. That parties regard jury trial as being important in negligence actions has long
been recognized. CLAsu & SHUL-mAN, A STUDY oF LAW ADmrImsTRATION M2' CONNECr-
cur 60 (1937). Jury trial is significant not only in that there is greater likelihood of a
plaintiff's verdict, but also in that the chance of a plaintiff's "getting to the jury" is a
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The declaratory action already possesses certain procedural advantages for
insurers. It gives them a choice of forum' 9 which formerly lay only with the
insured or the injured party in a tort action or an action on the policy.20 And
in contrast to the general verdict commonly rendered by a jury in an action on
a policy,21 the declaratory action usually involves only a special verdict, where
jury sympathies are thought to operate less freely.22
The existing benefits to insurers are perhaps inherent in a declaratory
judgment proceeding. The further advantage bestowed in the Brook Farm
case is not; nor is it an advantage which the framers of the statute intended to
grant 2a
significant factor in insurance company settlement policies. James, Accident Liability
Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 567-- (1948).
One study revealed that ". . . two-thirds of the motor vehicle cases tried by a jury
are terminated in favor of the plaintiff." REPORT BY THE COMMIrrEE TO STUDY COM-
PENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RE-
SEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 90 (1932). More recent studies indicate an even
greater percentage of plaintiff verdicts. James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negli-
gence Cases, 58 YAL L.J. 667, 687 (1949).
In addition, if judgment in the declaratory action is adverse to the defendant, he can
no longer reach the tort-feasor's insurance. While the declaratory defendant may still
have a cause of action against the tort-feasor, as far as the defendant is concerned the
tort-feasor is now uninsured. Recovery under these conditions may be difficult. For
example, the Columbia study reported 2,500 cases of temporary disability where there
was insurance and 900 where there was not. Claimants received payment in 86 per cent
of the insurance cases while payment was received in only 27 per cent of the uninsured
cases. COLUMBIA UNrvERsITY REPORT, supra, at 203, 204.
19. For discussion of this and possible other procedural advantages see Develop-
inents in the Law.-Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62 HARv. L. Rnv. 787, 836-8
(1949).
20. Under modem standard policy provisions the injured party is given a direct
right of action against insurer, once insurer liability has been established by judgment
or agreement of all parties. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of
Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 563 (1948).
21. BORcHARD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 674-5.
22. Ibid.; Cull, Practical Use of Federal Declaratory Judgment Act in Liability In-
surance Cases, 8 J. BAR Ass'x. OF THE STATE OF KANsAs, 195, 206-8 (1939) ; James, Func-
tions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L. J. 667, 683-4 (1949).
23. The courts as well as the draftsmen of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act, 9 U.L.A. 215-60 (1942) and the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-2 (1948) have emphasized that the declaratory action was not designed to afford
either party a procedural advantage. See note 2 supra. The purposes of declaratory
judgments are listed by Borchard, The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 18 MIrNN.
L. REv. 239, 257-61 (1934). See also Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial
Rights-The Declaratory Judgment, 16 MicH. L. REv. 69 (1917).
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